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INTRODUCTION
Rule 5 of the Rules Regulating the Conduct of Proceedings of Magistrates’ 
Courts of South Africa in GN R720 GG 33487 of 23 August 2010 provides 
for the process that parties should follow when they institute an action against 
another in a magistrate’s court. The sub-rule states:
‘(2) (a)  In every case where the claim is not for a debt or liquidated de- 
 mand the summons shall be a combined summons similar to 
 Form 2B of Annexure 1, to which summons shall be annexed a 
 statement of the material facts relied upon by the plaintiff in support 
 of plaintiff ’s claim, and which statement shall, amongst others, 
 comply with rule 6, but in divorce matters a combined summons 
 substantially compliant with Form 2C shall be used.
 (b) Where the claim is for a debt or liquidated demand the summons may 
 be a simple summons similar to Form 2 of Annexure 1.’ 
Causes of action based on the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (‘NCA’) 
qualify for the simpler process provided for by sub-rule 2(b). As is the case 
with its counterpart in high court practice (rule 17(2)(b) of the Uniform 
Rules Regulating the Conduct of Proceedings of the Several Provincial and 
Local Divisions of the High Court of South Africa in GN R48 GG 999 of 
12 January 1965), this rule allows the plaintiff in these matters the option 
of circumventing the more cumbersome process under sub-rule 2(a), which 
requires additional information and effort in drafting the ‘statement of the 
material facts … in support of plaintiff ’s claim …’. Due to the overwhelming 
majority of NCA-related cases occurring within its jurisdiction, this note will 
focus on the position in the magistrates’ courts. The arguments proposed in 
this note apply mutatis mutandis to the situation in the higher courts.
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On 12 December 2018, the Rules Board for Courts of Law of the 
Republic of South Africa circulated an invitation for comments regarding the 
proposed amendments to rule 5 of the Magistrates’ Courts Rules (‘MCR’). 
The invitation had its origin in representations addressed to the Rules Board 
to reconsider the function and requirements of the simple and combined 
summons in terms of the MCR, with regard to matters where the NCA is 
applicable. These representations suggested that the current stipulations for 
the rule regarding the simple summons, as an instrument to initiate claims 
based on the NCA, failed adequately to address the requirements stated in 
ss 129 and 130 of the NCA. It pointed out that this failure to comply with 
the rules left plaintiffs who had used the simple summons in NCA matters in 
an untenable position of facing resulting points in limine raised by defendants. 
This attempt to bring the process in the magistrates’ courts in line with the 
provisions of the NCA is not without precedent, as the NCA has previously 
warranted other comparable amendments: for example that in s 29(1)(e) of the 
Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 (Michelle Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit 
Regulation in South Africa (2012) 515–16).
In response to these representations, the Rules Board proposed to amend 
certain parts of rule 5 of the MCR. First, it recommended the insertion of 
rule 5(2)(b)(ii), to provide that ‘if the cause of action is based on a contract the 
plaintiff shall indicate whether the contract is in writing or oral, when, where 
and by whom it was concluded, and if the contract is in writing a copy thereof 
or of the part relied on shall be annexed to the simple summons’. Secondly, the 
Rules Board proposed to amend rule 5(7) in order to extend its applicability 
in NCA matters by deleting the restriction to include related provisions only 
in the case of judgments in terms of s 58 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act (see 
paras 3 and 4 of the Rules Board’s invitation to proposed amendments dated 
12 December 2018). The proposal was to amend rule 5(7) to read as follows:
‘Where the plaintiff issues a simple summons in respect of a claim regulated 
by legislation the summons may contain a bare allegation of compliance 
with the legislation, but the declaration, if any, must allege full particulars 
of such compliance: Provided that where the original cause of action is a 
credit agreement under the National Credit Act, 2005, the plaintiff shall in 
the summons deal with each one of the relevant provisions of sections 129 
and 130 of the National Credit Act, 2005, and allege that each one has been 
complied with.’
This note will critically evaluate the Rules Board’s proposal to bring rule 5 
of the MCR in line with the provisions of the NCA. This will be done by 
considering the purpose of the simple summons and the associated ‘label’ 
(Stephen Peté, David Hulme & Max du Plessis Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 
3 ed (2016) 183), as well as the difference between this label and the declaration 
which follows the defended simple summons in NCA-related matters. The 
relevant requirements of the NCA will be examined briefly to illustrate the 
label’s inability to meet these requirements, and will assess the Rules Board’s 
suggested solution to address this deficiency. In the final instance, I will consider 
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whether the suggested amendments are the best course to follow, and proffer 
an alternative solution.
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT AND 
PROPOSED RULES RELATING TO THE SIMPLE SUMMONS 
WHEN WEIGHED AGAINST THE PROVISIONS OF THE NCA
As the name suggests, the simple summons is less arduous in its drafting 
requirements than the combined summons. It is used in cases where the cause 
of action is based on a liquid claim, in other words for a ‘fixed, certain or 
ascertained amount or thing’ (Peté et al op cit at 182). The simple summons is 
not a pleading and does not contain a separate particulars of claim. Instead, it 
incorporates ‘merely a label’ (D E van Loggerenberg Jones & Buckle: The Civil 
Practice of the Magistrates’ Courts in South Africa 10 ed (2017) Rule 5-6A), done 
in ‘legal shorthand’ (Peté et al op cit at 183).This label succinctly describes the 
basis of the plaintiff ’s claim and the nature of the relief requested. The plaintiff 
will be obliged to serve a pleading, known as a declaration, on the defendant 
only in the event of the defendant defending the action. This declaration 
contains ‘a detailed and complete explanation’ (C Theophilopoulos, C M van 
Heerden & A Boraine Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure 3 ed (2015) 189) 
of the cause of action, analogous to that contained in the particulars of claim 
of a combined summons.
The simple summons is useful for its brevity and the resulting saving 
in costs. The majority of liquid claims are undefended (Peté et al op cit at 
184); therefore, one could argue that they do not require the drafting of a 
detailed explanation. Importantly, the purpose of the simple summons and its 
label could be seen as twofold. From the defendant’s perspective, it exists to 
indicate what type of claim the defendant is facing and to afford the defendant 
sufficient information successfully to defend an application for summary 
judgment. From the perspective of the court, the simple summons needs to 
contain sufficient detail to enable it ‘to decide whether [summary or default] 
judgment should be granted’ (Van Loggerenberg op cit at Rule 5-6A), which, 
obviously, is also the plaintiff ’s agenda in drafting it.
In keeping with the stated purpose of the simple summons, a ‘legal 
shorthand’ has evolved over the years to describe the various types of liquid 
claims that often reoccur in the label part of these summonses. Labels drafted 
as a result of cases based on the NCA will typically contain the following 
allegations: 
‘The plaintiff ’s claim is against the defendant for payment of the sum of 
R150  000 being the amount due, owing and payable by the defendant to 
the plaintiff in respect of monies lent and advanced by the plaintiff to the 
defendant at the defendant’s special instance and request during the period 
May to August 2016 (both months inclusive), which amount is due (as from 
… [due date]).’ (See for example Peté et al op cit at 638.)
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Of particular relevance is the fact that these ‘summarized cause[s] of action 
and the concise particulars of claims included in a simple summons’ do not 
have to comply with rule 6 of the MCR (Theophilopoulos et al op cit at 
191). While the label should disclose the cause of action to a lesser extent, it is 
therefore not necessary to abide by the rules that generally relate to pleadings.
In contrast, a declaration is a proper pleading, requiring strict adherence 
to the requirements set forth by rule 6. It has to be filed within fifteen days of 
delivery of the defendant’s notice of intention to defend. In the case of claims 
based on the NCA, Harms suggests that a declaration should contain the 
following averments (L T C Harms Amler’s Precedents of Pleadings 9 ed (2018) 
140–1):
‘1. Plaintiff is a credit provider registered with the National Credit Regulator 
in terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005.
2. On [date] at [place], plaintiff and defendant concluded a written agree-
ment of lease in terms of which plaintiff let to defendant a certain motor 
vehicle. A copy of the agreement is attached.
3. The agreement complies with the Act.
4. The material terms of the agreement of lease are the following: [detail].
5. Plaintiff has performed its obligations in terms of the agreement of lease.
6. In breach of the agreement of lease, defendant has [state nature of breach].
7. Plaintiff has cancelled [not cancelled] the agreement.
8. Defendant is in default and has been in default for at least 20 days.
9. Plaintiff has complied with the provisions of  section 130  of the Act. 
A copy of the section 129 notice is attached.
10. Defendant has not responded to the notice.
11. There is no matter arising out of the credit agreement pending before 
the National Consumer Tribunal.
12. Plaintiff is entitled to payment of the full balance outstanding, being the 
sum of [Rx].
13. Defendant is entitled to a reduction of finance charges of [Ry].
14. In the premises, defendant is indebted to plaintiff in the sum of [Rx – Ry].
15. Payment of the aforesaid amount of [Rx – Ry] will not place plaintiff 
in a better financial position than that in which plaintiff would have 
been had defendant carried out his obligations in terms of the agreement 
of lease.
The plaintiff claims [detail].’
In addition to abiding by the requirements of MCR 6 (and specifically 
sub-rule 6), the declaration therefore also caters to the requirements of ss 129 
and 130 of the NCA. These requirements, and their significance, are discussed 
by Kelly-Louw (op cit at 442):
‘Section 130(3) introduces a number of aspects on which a court must be 
satisfied before it will determine a matter in any proceedings to which the 
National Credit Act applies. It provides that despite any provision of law or 
contract to the contrary, in any proceedings commenced in a court in respect 
of a credit agreement to which the National Credit Act applies, the court may 
determine the matter only if the court is satisfied that — …’.
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Kelly-Louw then proceeds to list several factors, including whether 
proceedings prescribed by ss 127, 129 and 131 of the NCA have been 
complied with when relevant, whether a matter arising from the particular 
credit agreement is currently pending before the National Consumer 
Tribunal, whether the plaintiff approached the court while the matter is still 
before a debt counsellor, ombud, consumer court, and so forth. Kelly-Louw 
also refers to further authority to submit that when a court is approached to 
enforce a credit agreement or to enforce ‘remaining obligations’ of consumers, 
‘compliance with all the relevant provisions (e g, s 130(1), (2) or (3)) is peremptory 
and has to be alleged …’ (Kelly-Louw op cit at 442n263, emphasis supplied).
The aim of this note is not to elaborate on the specific allegations that are, 
or could be, required in terms of the NCA under every applicable scenario. 
The point is that there are sound reasons why the content of the declaration 
is detailed to the extent suggested. 
While the declaration addresses these elaborate requirements, it is likewise 
clear that the content of the simple summons’ label, in terms of current 
practice, fails to measure up to the requirements of the NCA. Our courts 
have confirmed as much in various decisions quoted by Van Loggerenberg 
(Van Loggerenberg op cit at Rule 5-6A). When defendants have raised these 
deficiencies as points in limine, the courts have generally focused on the need 
to attach copies of the relevant documents (contracts) to the simple summons 
(see Van Loggerenberg op cit at Rule 5-6A, quoting Absa Bank Ltd v Janse 
van Rensburg 2013 (5) SA 173 (WCC) at 176F–180E and ABSA Bank Ltd v 
Studdard [2012] ZAGPJHC 26). Nevertheless, the mere inclusion of a copy 
of the relevant contract (similar to the process prescribed for pleadings in 
MCR 6(6)) would fall short of alleviating the problem. As noted earlier, the 
requirements of the NCA demand much more.
The Rules Board has accordingly suggested two amendments to the 
MCR dealing with the content of the simple summons. In the first instance, 
they suggest that MCR 5(2)(b) be expanded to provide for details, and 
written copies, of contracts when the cause of action is based on a contract. 
Secondly, they submit that the ambit of MCR 5(7) should be widened to 
require allegations of compliance with ss 129 and 130 of the NCA in NCA- 
related matters. 
I support the suggested insertion of sub-rule (ii) into MCR 5(2)(b). As a 
general practice, when a simple summons is issued on the basis of a contract, 
there should be some detail about that contract in the label. At the same 
time, however, it must be acknowledged that this amendment is likely to 
cause additional concern to the parties, courts and processes in general. The 
proliferation of formal requirements to produce valid forms, including the simple 
summons, will probably mean that a greater number of simple summonses 
will be formally defective in future, rendering them susceptible to applications 
for irregular steps. This will prolong and complicate the civil procedure and 
contribute to further congestion in our courts. That said, I am not in favour 
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of the approach suggested by the proposed amendment of MCR 5(7), which 
will have the effect of requiring substantial detail and a significant addition to 
the content of the existing label, as sanctioned by MCR 5(2)(b). As discussed 
above, the court is unable to determine a matter involving the NCA unless 
the substantial requirements of the relevant sections of that Act have been 
properly canvassed in the document. In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v 
Dawood 2012 (6) SA 151 (WCC) at 157A–B the court observed: 
‘Nowadays … the simple summons can no longer be regarded as merely “a 
lable to the claim”, at least not in claims where the NCA is applicable. This is so 
… due to “the myriad allegations which a plaintiff is [now] required to make 
regarding NCA compliance where the statute is applicable and compliance 
with the constitutional imperatives prescribed by s 26(1) of the Constitution”.’ 
In the case of Absa Bank Ltd v Janse van Rensburg (supra) para 17), the court 
stated that ‘this latter requirement [the court deciding whether judgment 
should be granted] has assumed added importance in the light of the 
constitutional and statutory need for judicial oversight in matters involving 
the NCA, especially where the homes of debtors are concerned ...’.
The ‘myriad’ allegations that would now have to be condensed into the label 
of the simple summons in NCA matters in order to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny is at complete odds with the nature and purpose of the label as 
discussed above. If the proposed amendment is accepted and implemented, 
the nature of the simple summons in NCA-related matters would be radically 
altered. It will no longer be suited to the ‘abbreviated form’, as prescribed by 
Form 2 of Annexure 1 as required by MCR 5(2)(b). This is problematic, as 
‘Form 2 requires that the plaintiff ’s cause of action must be set out in “concise 
terms”’ (Van Loggerenberg op cit at Rule 5-6, emphasis supplied).
In addition, to require this level of detail in the label would distort the 
difference between the simple summons and the subsequent declaration in 
defending matters. One has to question to what extent, if at all, these two 
documents will differ, and what value the declaration will add. Requiring 
similar details in the label and the declaration will lead to an unnecessary 
duplication in the process and an increase in associated legal costs. Finally, 
it could also be argued that limiting the extension of MCR 5(7) to 
incorporate only the requirements of ss 129 and 130 of the NCA might be 
ineffective in light of the various other sections that may be relevant under 
specific circumstances.
AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION
In my opinion, the level of detail now expected from the summons in NCA 
matters has, for the most part, annulled the distinction in content between the 
label contained in the simple summons and the particulars of claim attached 
to the combined summons. In this regard, it is important to note further that 
MCR 5(2)(b) affords the plaintiff the option to use the combined summons, 
even in liquid claims. The rule provides for this option by the use of the word 
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‘may’. Some authors argue that this permission in the magistrates’ courts is an 
improvement to the more prescriptive situation in the high court, and that the 
appropriate high court rule should follow suit (see Peté et al op cit at 184).
There is strong authority for the view that the simple summons should not 
be used in cases where the cause of action is not susceptible to the ‘concise’ 
and ‘abbreviated’ description required by Form 2. Peté et al argue that issuing 
a combined summons instead of a simple summons makes sense when the 
plaintiff suspects that the matter may be defended, as this will not only save 
costs in the long run, but also that ‘there are certain liquidated claims … which 
require fairly complex pleading and do not lend themselves to the manner in 
which simple summonses are customarily drafted’ (ibid). Van Loggerenberg 
expresses the view that ‘[i]f this [setting out the cause of action in ‘concise’ 
terms] is not possible[,] a combined summons could be used although 
the action is for a debt or liquidated demand’ (Van Loggerenberg op cit at 
Rule 5-6).
MCR 5(2)(b) currently allows the plaintiff to choose whether or not to 
make use of a simple summons. This permission confirms that the intention 
is not for a simple summons to be utilised in every circumstance where it 
is available. Without a doubt, there are also other more complicated liquid 
cases, like causes of action based on mortgage bonds, which should not be 
brought to court by way of simple summonses (see Peté et al op cit at 184). 
Accordingly, where NCA matters are concerned, the use of a combined 
summons should be prescriptive. Such arrangement would address most, if 
not all, of the concerns raised in this note in terms of the existing impasse 
between the requirements of the NCA and the stipulations of the MCR 
regarding the simple summons.
In the final event, as an alternative to the position taken by the Rules 
Board, I propose that the existing MCR ought to be amended as follows, the 
suggested amendments being indicated in italics:
‘(2) (a) In every case where the claim is not for a debt or liquidated demand, 
 other than a claim in terms of the National Credit Act, 34 of 2005, the 
 summons shall be a combined summons similar to Form 2B of 
 Annexure 1, to which summons shall be annexed a statement of the 
 material facts relied upon by the plaintiff in support of plaintiff ’s 
 claim, and which statement shall, amongst others, comply with rule 6. 
 (b) (i) Where the claim is for a debt or liquidated demand, other than 
  a claim in terms of the National Credit Act, 34 of 2005, the 
  summons may be a simple summons similar to Form 2 of 
  Annexure 1.
  (ii) if the cause of action is based on a contract, the plaintiff shall indicate 
  whether the contract is in writing or oral, when, where and by whom it 
  was concluded, and if the contract is in writing a copy thereof or of the part relied 
  on shall be annexed to the simple summons.’ 
             
